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Sub-optimalTariff Policy andGainsfrom Trade
for LDCs with UrbanUnemployment
M. ALI KHAN and PO-SHENG LIN*
In this paperweexaminethe issueof gainsfrom tradein a settingwhich
admitsurbanunemploymentandavarietyof urban,labourmarketconditions.In
additionto theconventionalcriterion,we alsoconsiderthecasewhenthesizeof
the urbanunemployedis the sole determinantof welfare. The resultslean
heavilyon factor marketstabilityand are sensitiveto the commoditybeing
importedandto theassumptionof intersectoralmobilityof capital.
In thedecadesincethepublicationof Harris-Todaro'spaper[16],various
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!This has also beenreferredto as the segmentationmodelof unemployment;seethe
introductionin Sabot(1978).
2It is worthremindingthereaderthatnon-shiftablecapitalcanbealternativelyviewedas
two differentfactors,say,rural land andurbancapital. On non-shiftablecapital,wehave,in
additionto thework of Harris-Todaro,theinvestigationsof Bhagwati-Srinivasan[7; 8], Stiglitz
[34; 35; 36], Corden [13, pp. 144-48], Corden-Findlay [14], Srinivasan-Bhagwati[33],
Calvo [11] , Hazari [17, Chapter 7] and Khan [25] .
3In the contextof intersectoralcapitalmobility,we havethework of Corden-Findlay
[14], Khan [23;24], Neary[29] andStiglitz[36].
4Thisisjust a corollaryof Proposition4 in Bhagwati[3,p. 81].
~






is worthpointingout in thisconnectionthatthroughoutthispaper,we





I. THE GENERALIZEDHARRIS-TODAROMODEL ~~
WeshallbeworkingwiththegeneralizedHarris-TodaromOdelwhich \VI
avarietyof labourmarketspecificationsemphasizedin theliterature.suc~~.isbasedonKhan[24;25]. \\"Let a countryconsistof an urbananda ruralsector,indexedby , ;;..
respectively,andletit beendowedwithnon-negativeamountsoflabour, \.. \\ral
capital,%. Lettheith sectorproducea commodityinamOuntX. inac~ ''Q
withaproductionfunction 1 ~~'\ 01\:~l1c











in modelswithfullemploymentof labour.7 Thus,despiteBhagwati'spropositions,







Todaroliterature;seeKhan[26]. Sucha resultarguesfor afurtherscrutinyof the
gains-from-tradequestionin theHarris-Todarosetting.In anycase,thequestionis
importantenoughthatit is desirableto havesharperesultsthancanbededuced
fromBhagwati'sfundamentalpropositions.To providesuchnecessaryandsufficient
conditionsis theprincipalobjectof thispaper.A secondaryobjectis to seewhat




A usefulby-productof ourinvestigationis thatweobtainformulaefor sub-
optimalor second-bestariffs.Theseareof relevancetogovernmentswhichcannot







(12a) P FK =R =P FK . , .~ .. r r u u \ >I
~
P FL =wand p FL =wr r r u u u(1.2b)
whereFlis thederivativeof Fi withrespecttoj, j
is too smallto influencePu and Pr' positive
commodities.
Theequilibriuminthelabourmarketisgivenby
SBhagwatidoesnot statethisasa propositionand thesequotesarefromBhagwati[4,p.
(1.3) w = (1 + :\) wu r
= L, K andi =:u,r. The
internationalpricesof t~~
'\,
\\v~46J.6This is Proposition6 in Bhagwati[3, p. 86J. Of course,in our context,thedistortion
whichis beingreducedis thetariffrate.
7An exceptionis therecentworkof Brecher[9J .
8Indeed,in his importantpaper,Neary[28J dismissesthisquestionin a footnote;seehis
footnote8.
where:\ is theratioof theunemployedtotheurbanemployed.ThusL Il
u 1.\
9As is well known,thequestionof sub-optimaltariffswasfirst raisedby Ke ~\
[22] andfurtherelaborateduponby Bhagwati-Ramaswami-Srinivasan[6J andKem;;(~',ill]. ~ \
108 M. Ali KhanandPo-ShengUn
canbe takento be the probabilityof findinga job in the urbansector,a formaliza-
tion dueto Harris-Todaro [16]. Unlike them,however,weshallallowthepossibil-




(lAb) w =new i\ K 0/ )u e' , u'J
whereY is ashiftparameter.Foradiscussionof themicrofoundationsof (1.4a
andlAb), seeKhan[25and26respectively].Thereit isshownthatspecializations
of then (0) functionsyieldnotonlytheoriginalHarris-Todarorigidwagesetting
studiedfurtherby Bhagwati-Srinivasan,Corden-Findlay,Stiglitz10 andothers,but
alsoallowus to incorporateconsiderationsarisingfrom labour-turnoverasin
Akerlof-Stiglitz[1], andStiglitz[34],or theefficiencywageasinStiglitz[35],or




(1.5) K + K =all andL + L (I+i\) =~r '-U fi r u
Fortheimmobilecapitalcase,thefirstequationin (1.5)hasnomeaning.
2. PRELIMINARY ANALYSISOF THEPROBLEM












10Thereferenceto Stiglitz is his forthcomingpiecein theSabotvolume[30J. For the
work of theotherauthors,seethereferenceslistedin footnotes3 and4.








(2.1a) W = <p(i\Lu)'qJ (0) < 0
Thesecondisthemoretraditional
(2.1b) u =U(C 0 C )r u




tion ratherthanwithU (0). Let g(Pr'Pu'U) betheminimumexpenditureatthe
pricesPr' Pu requiredto attainthelevelof socialwelfaregivenby U. It iswell
known(see,for example,theexpositorypaperof Gorman[15]),thatg is (i) posi-
tivelyhomogeneousof degreeonein prices;(ii) concavefunctionof theprices;and
(iii) suchthatg. == ag(0)/ap. = C., i = u, r. Nowletu betheimportedcom-I I I
modityandt thetariffrate.Thenthefollowingequationisbasicfortheanalysisof
tariffpolicyofa"small"economy.




(2.3) ~ (p X + P (l+t)X) =-w L ~ + p X
at r r u u r u at u u
weobtain
(2.4) g (1 - mt) au=(p2t) ~
.
- axu 1- w L ~
0 1+tat u 'Luu apu(I+fU r u at
wherego is the inverseof themarginalutilityof incomeandm is themarginal
propensitytoconsumetheimportedcommodity.
It iswellknownthatpositivityof theterm(I-(mt/1+t»ispreciselythecondi-
tion for internationalcommoditymarketsto bestablewhenthetermsof tradeare
given;seeKemp[21]andBhagwatiandKemp[5]. Weshallassumethistobesoin
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thesequel.Thus,theanalysisof thepropositionsli tedabovereducestoevaluation
of thesignof thetermau/at. Givenconcavityassumptions,12thesubstitutionterm
isnegativeandwearereducedto ananalysisof theprice-outputresponseaXuiapu
(1+t)andtheunemploymentrateresponseaA/at. However,if wedenotethecom-
pensated(constantutility)priceelasticityof urbanimportsby Eu' equation(2.4)
canbemanipulatedtoyield13
~
(C X) -j25 1- mt dU = X u - u E - (J A( . ) go( 1+t) dt Pu u (1+t) Xu u uL t
Thus,anincreasein thetariffrateonurbanimportsleadstoanincreasein welfare
if andonlyif
3. THE SETTINGWITHINTERSECTORALLY MOBILECAPITAL
In thissectionwepresentresultson gainsfromtradewhencapitalis inter-
sectorallymobile. Theseresultsaredevelopedin threesteps.Firstly,weconsider
theeffectof tariffsandtermsof tradechangesonurbanemployment.Secondly,we
recalla resultona characterizationf dynamicstabilityin factormarkets.Finally,
wepiecethesestepstogetherin termsof theanalysispresentedin Section2. The
resultson the effectsof tariffson urbanemploymentmaybe of independent
interest.
(2.6) (t/1+t)(( Cu - Xu)/Xu)Eu > (JuL(AIi)
3.1 TheEffectofaTariffonUrbanEmployment




for a modificationof (2.6)whentheruralcommodityisbeingimported.14The
readercancheckforhimselfthatanincreasein thetariffrateonruralimportsleads
toanincreaseinwelfareif andonlyif
(3.1.1) Sign [(JuK8rL - (JrK(JuL]
(2.7) (t/1+t)((Cr- Xr)/Xr) Er> (JrL((g'-Lr)/Lr) (~!i)
where(Jij is theshareof thejth factorin thevalueof ithsectoroutput.Now,given
thelabourmarketequilibriumcondition
Analysisof terms-of-tradechangesinvolvesno tariffsandin thiscase,theana-
logueof (2.4)is
(3.1.2) w (1+A)=n(w ,A,R,a')r r J'
(2.8) (i =u, r)
in theHarris-Todaromodel,theeffectof tariffson theunemploymentrateA reduces




thecostof productionof theith commodityfor a cet.par. proportionalchangein
thepriceof thejth factor.Thusallweneedto doin ourgeneralizedsettingis to
calculatesuchchangesin thevariouscostsof productionby allowingfor thefact
thatwuisnotbeingchangedirectlybutasaresultof changesinwr'R andA. Thus,
(JrKand(JrLneednomodificationbut(JuLand(JuKneedtoberecalculated.Letthe
elasticitiescorrespondingto then ( .) functionbegivenby
g au =- (c. - X.) - w L ~
0 api 1 1 r u api
Thus,an improvementin thetermsof tradeleadstoanimprovementin welfareif
andonlyif
(2.9a) (A/p) > - (( Cu - Xu)/X) (l/(JuL)
(~/Pr)> - (( Cr - Xr) /Xr) (L/.~-Lr) (1/(JrL)(2.9b)
12Thereadershouldbe remindedthata strictlyconcavefunctiondoesnotimplythatits
secondderivativeis negativeverywhere.Weshallignorethispathologicalpossibilityhere.
13Henceforth xdenotes dx/x except for Aandi iwhicharerespectivelygivenbydA/(1+A)
and dt/l +tj" This lattermodificationis requiredto admitcaseswhenA or ti maybezero.
Furthermore,(JiL is theshareof labourin theith sector,i =u, r.
14This is of coursenot in contrast to the differentialwagemodels,seeBatra [2,
pp.263-70].
e =alogn( .) e =alogn ( .) e =alogn ( .)
w alogwr ' A aA ' R alogR
andconsideracet.par.proportionalchangein theruralwage.Thishastwoeffects
on thecostof productionof theuthcommodity.A directeffectresultingfroma





(3.1.8) SignlDI =°uKOrL - °rKOuL
(3.1.3) 'A/il =(1-e )/ (e"\-1)r w . 1\ Thus,thepriceoutputresponsedependsonSign(JDI x I~I)justasinJones[18].
(3.1.6)and(3.1.8)representthetwo basicelementsof themodel. Using
them,wecanderive16thefollowingrelationships
. . IDI ) 0
(3.1.9a) 'A/tu =(1+(e'A-1) ~)/OUL =(OrK (1-ew + rLeR)/I~1
. . IDI





0 e (1-e) . 0
(3.1.4) 0 e + uL 'A w =~ (e - e )
uL w e'A- 1 e'A- 1 'A w
Analogousreasoningyieldsa recalculated0uK' Here,in additionto thedirect
effect0uK' therearetwoindirecteffects.Bothof theseinvolveinducedchangesin




(3.1.9c) lfe'A'S O,eR ::::O'and°'Sew ~ I,Sign('l//tu) = -Sign(V/ir)








assumptioni theseformulaethatwhenchangesin ti arebeingconsidered,theith
commodityis beingimportedandthattj is zero. Secondly,it is obviousthat
formulae(3.1.9)remainthesamewhenchangesin Pi ratherthanti arebeing
considered.
=Sign [O~K8rL- O~LerK]




theanalogywiththeHOSmodel,or ratherits varientasin Jones[18],weneed
analoguesof physicalfactorintensitiesin additiontothevalueintensitiesof (3.1.1).
Theseare straightforward.Our modelexhibitsa versionof the Rybczynski






In thissectionwerecalla resulton thecharacterizationf dynamicstability
in factormarkets.Theunderlyingadjustmentprocessgis defmedbythefollowing
differentialequations.
!!If Kr =<I>{(Rr/Ru)- l} qJ > 0, <I>(0) = °
.0Lr = 1/1{wr(1+'A)/Wu)-l} 1/1'> 0, 1/1(0)= °
.0 'A = 1T{(Q (.) /wu) - I} 11 > 0, 1T(0)= °
where.0 is thetimederivativeoperatorandRi is theruralin sectori, i = u, r.
(3.1.7)
k
(K)Lu (1+'A)) - (K/Lr) ==( 1+uA - kr) 16Forequations(3.1.9aandb), seeequation2.9in Khan [23]. Equations(3.1.9c)follow
from equations(3.3.1)in Khan [23]. Indeed,Sections2 and3 in Khan [23] canbe seenasa
mathematicalappendixto Section3.1of thispaper.15SeeKhan [24].
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Sign(IDI x 1.:11)> 0
3.4 ResultsonGainsfromTradeinTermsofU
. Wenowconsiderthecasewhensocialwelfareis a concavefunctionof
domesticonsumption.Our firstresultpertainsto changesin thetermsof trade.
Let'Y-betheratioofdomesticonsumptiontodomesticproductionofcommodityi.1
Then(2.9)and(3.1.9)yield
Suchaprocesshasbeendiscussedby Khan [23] andhehasshown17
Theorem3.2.1. Let 101 =1=0, 1.:11=1=0 at a particularequilibrium. Thenlocal
asymptoticstabilityof suchanequilibriumimpliesthat









(a) Let theurbancommoditybeimported.Thenimprovementsin theterms
of tradeimprovewelfareif andonlyif
IDI
(3.4.1) (1- e").)1.:11< ru






(e - e ) In! >2- rrLr
W X IE] 2 - Lr








superiorto more-restrictedtradeandtu =0 is theoptimaltariff.
(b) If theruralcommodityis beingimported;freetradeis theworstpolicy;
improvementin thetermsof tradecausea deteriorationi welfare;more-
restrictedtradeis superiorto less-restrictedtradeandthesecondbesttariffis
theprohibitivetariffwhichguaranteesautarchy.
Remark3.4.2. For the rigidwagesettingstudiedby CordenandFindlay[14],
Stiglitz[36]andothers,ew = eX= 0,andRemark3.4.1canbesharpenedto
say thatwith ruralimports,improvementsin the termsof tradeimprove
welfareif andonlyif Qr > 1. Withurbanimports,therelevantconditionisr r








Remark 3.4.3. If ew =1 andeR=0 asin theHOS modelor asin thetradeunion
settingof Calvo[11], (3.4.1)and(3.4.2)respectivelyreduceto therequire-
menthatrand r exceedunity.Thisisalwaysfulfilled.u r
Wenowconsiderthedesirabilityof tariffswhentheeconomyis initiallyin a
laissez-faireequilibrium.Then(2.4)reducesto
17Thisis half of Theorem5.1in Khan [23J. There,hehasshownthat(I DI x1.:11)>0
isnecessaryandsufficientfor dynamicstabilityunderconditionsontheelasticitiesw'eRand
eX'It iseasytocheckthattheproofofTheorem3.2.1isindependentofthese lasticities.
Sign(3U/3t) =- Sign(X/ t)
andequations(3.1.9)yield
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PROPOSITION3.4.2.Lettheeconomybeinitiallyina laissez-faireequilibrium.
(a) If the urban commodityis being imported,then there existsa
welfare-improvingtariffif andonlyif
(J - ef) (IDI / I~I ) > I
or,equivalently,if andonlyif
(8rK(1-ew) + 8rLeR)/I~1< 0
* * .'
Remark3.4.8. If ew=1andeR=0,tu=tr =0,andless-restnctedtradeISalways
superiorto more-restrictedtrade.Thisis analternativestatementofRemark
3.4.5.
(b) If theruralcommodityis beingimported,thenthereexistsa welfare-
improvingtariffif andonlyif
(ew- e'A)(IDI / I~I) < 1
Remark3.4.9.Let°~ew < 1andeR :::°. Thentheurbansectorbeingmorecapi-
talintensiveinelasticity-adjustedtermsthantheruralsectorimpliesthat
or,equivalently,if andonlyif
t* <° andt*> °u r
(8uK (J - ew) + 8uLeR) / I~I > 0
andviceversaif theurbansectoris morelabourintensive.
Remark3.4.4. If e'A~0, thenunstablefactormarketsimplythattheredoesnot
existawelfareimprovingtariffonurbanimports.
Remark3.4.10. It is worth emphasizingthat equations(3.4.3)and (3.4.4)
characterizethesub-optimaltariffsif theyexist;weoffernosufficientcondi-
tionswhichguaranteetheirexistence,muchlesstheiruniqueness.18It is
becauseof thislackof uniquenessthatweonlyconfineourselvesto tariff-
changesintheneighbourhoodf theoptimalones.Remark3.4.5. If ew =I andeR =°asill theHeckscher-Ohlin-Samuelsonm del
or asin thetradeunionsettingstudiedby Calvo[11],theredoesnotexista
welfare-improvingtariff. 4. THE SETTINGWITHINTERSECTORALLY IMMOBILECAPITAL
Remark3.4.6. LeteR ::: ° and° ~ ew < 1. Then,thereexistsawelfare-improv-
ingtariffonurbanimportsif andonlyif theurbansectorislabourintensivein
elasticitiesadjustedtenns,Le.,~ < 0;andonruralimportsif andonlyif the
urbansectoriscapitalintensiveinelasticitiesadjustedterms,Le.,~>0.
In this sectionwe reconsiderthe resultsof Section3 in thecontextof
immobilecapital.Theorganizationof thissectionis identicalto thatof Section3.
It is worthmentioning,however,thatdynamic'stabilityconditionsdonotplayas
prominentarole.








Vinermodel.l9 It is wellknown20thattheanalysisof sucha modelreducesto
PROPOSITION3.4.3. Less-restrictedtradeis superior(inferior)tomore-restricted
tradeif andonlyif in theneighbourhoodf t~,t. > t~ (t. < t~)wherethe" I I I I I
sub-optimaltariffst i aregivenby
ISSuchconditionswouldinvolvedeterminationf theseconderivativesof.Q ( . ) and
third derivativesof F. ( .).




=( 1 ) () 8uL(8rK(1- ew) + 8rLeR)(3.4.3)
u
1+t" 'Yu - 1 Eu I Iu
"
t 1 ) ( ) QJ 1+'A)
8rL(8uK(1-e )+8 e)
(3.4.4)
r =- ( . w uL R
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Q a (-l: Q.a.)
u u i=u,r I I




where17.is theelasticityof demand22for labourin sectori.I
The sizeof theurbanunemployedis givenbyV =AL andthuswecanwrite
A u
(4.1.5a) Wit =Qr17r17u(1-eA)/11
(4.1.5b) if lir ={Qr17r(1- ew)+Qr17r17u(eA- ew)}I 11
4.2 A ResultonDynamicStabilityinFactorMarkets
Consideran adjustmentprocess!J/! definedby the followingdifferential
equations.
~ wr =4>{(Lr + (1+A)Ljq) - I}
~ A = 1/1{(f2( .) I (1+A)Wr) - I}
qJ (0)> 0, 4> (0) =0
wherea. is theelasticity of substitutionin sectori andQ.=L.I (£7Just asin SectionI I IX.
3, a correspondingequationsystemfor the Harris-Todarosettingcan be written
down by suitablerecalculationsof the Booand a.. Now, if we chooseto workwith-' IJ I -
the rural wagewr as therelevantunknown,BrK andBrL remainthesame.Since~
doesnotenterin f2( . ) function(see2.4b),8uKisalsounchanged.Thustheonly
recalculationpertainstoBuLwhichcanbenowwrittenas
(4.1.2) BuL(eA- ew)I (eA-1)
as discussedunder(3.1.4). In thethird row of thematrixin (4.1.1),theonly
changes are that Q is measuredinclusiveof urbanunemployment,Le., Lu u
(1 +A);rb1andthat- l:Q.a.,theaggregateelasticityof labourdemand,is givenby;:z;. I I
1/1' (0)> 0,1/1(0)=0
Khan[26] hasshown23
Q a (e...- e) Q (1 - e ) -
(4.1.3) - Qrar- u u 1\ w + u w
eA- 1 eA- 1
Thefirsttermneedsnoexplanation.Q a is thecet.par.changein thedemandforu u




Wecannowcalculatechangesin R. andw , andhenceA,for correspondingI r
changesin p.. However,atthispointanaturalquestionarisesastowhywedonotI
exploit this resemblancewith the Ricardo-Viner modelevenfurther and merely
substitutethemodifiedentries(4.1.2)and(4.1.3)inthesolutionscalculated,say,by




Theorem4.2.1.Let eA < 1 ataparticularequilibrium.Thenlocalasymptoticsta-
bilityof suchanequilibriumimpliesthat11> O.





AssumptionE. eA~0 and0~ew ~1
Thisis reallyan innocuousassumption24in thelightof previouswork;seeKhan
[25]. Wecannowstate
(4.1.4a) Alii =Qi17i(1 - ew)I 11 (i =u,r)
22It is well known that 17.=-a.IB.K'I I I
23.Thisis half of Proposition3.3.in Khat)[25]. TherehehasalsoshownthateA "50 and
ew '5 lImply thatanequilibriumof .9l!is locally,asymptoticallystable.
24Theonly settingsknownto usfor whiche maybegreaterthanonearethosediscussed
by Calvo [10;11]. However,Calvo [11] assum~sa Cobb-Douglastechnologyin the urban
sectorwhichdoesimplye <1. Thusthepossibilitye >I restson moregeneraltechnologies.
In anycase,a sufficient1;hugevalueof e impliesinftabilityof equilibriumin factormarkets








w I l,q-QK -Q Kr r u u




Our first resultrelatesto changesin thetermsof trade. It is obtainedby
substituting(4.1.4a)in (2.9)
PROPOSITION4.4.1
(a) Let theurbancommoditybeimported.Thenimprovementsin theterms
of tradeimprovewelfareif andonlyif
e 917(1-e)




e £ (1+X)17r(1- ew) >(1 - "Ir)rL u
A
Remark4.4.1.If ew=1,termsof tradeimprovementsalwaysimprovewelfare.
Next,we considerthequestionof theexistenceof welfare-improvingtariffs
whentheeconomyisinitiallyinapositionof laissez-faire.
PROPOSITION 4.4.2. Let eX~0;factor marketsby dynamicallystablein termsof
adjustmentprocess!!fl; andlet the economybe initiallyin a laissez-faire
equilibrium.Thenthereexistwelfare-improvingtariffsifandonlyif25ew<1.
Ourfmalresultof thissubsectionconcernssub-optimaltariffsandthesuperi-
ority of less-restrictedtradeto more-restrictedtrade. Equations(2.6),(2.7)and
(4.1.4)yield
PROPOSITION4.4.3. Less-restrictedtradeis superior(inferior)tomorerestricted* * *
tradeif andonlyif ~ntheneighbourhoodf t i' ti > t i (ti < t i)'wherethe
sub-optimaltariffst iaregivenby
t* e £17(1-e)
~= (~ ) ( ~) uL u u w




~ =( 1 ) (~) erL£u (1 +X)17r(1-ew)
1 +t "Ir - 1 E Ar r
25It is easyto deducefrom (2.4)and(4.1.4)that thereexistwelfare-improvingtariffsif
and only if £i17'(l-ew)/A. Sincefactormarketstabilityimplies,undereX s: 0, thatA> 0,
Proposition4.4.1follows.
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Remark4.4.2. If factormarketsaredynamicallystable,then't; > 0 if andonlyif
ew < 1.
*





Corden-Findlay [14] arethe only authorsto havediscussedtariffsin thecon-
text of intersectoralcapitalmobility. Theirbriefdiscussion26focusseson the
importanceof changesin theunemploymentrateasthecrucialdeterminantof the
welfare-effectof tariffs. Theywrite,"Tariffs. . .mayfail to raisenetoutputat
worldpricesbecausetheriseinmanufacturingoutputmaybeoffsetbyagreaterfall




beingimported,seeProposition3.3.1. This statementis conditionedon factor
marketsbeingdynamicallystablewhichreducesin thiscontext,to therequirement
thattheurbansectoris capitalintensivein employmentadjustedterms;seeKhan
[23]andNeary[29]. In termsof thewelfarefunctionD, changesin thetermsof




1+ t*u =(---s )(J-) (k (~r+X) )"Iu u u
t*r
1+t* = - c-..! ) (~
)




tariff policy... [is] ... equivalentto a productiontax-cum-subsidypolicy,plus
consumptiontax-cum-subsidypolicy,"andshowthataproductionsubsidyto the




















sized,though,thatin thecontextof thewelfarefunctionU, thebehaviourofCalvo's
modelis identicalto thatof theHOSor Ricardo-Vinermodels;seeRemarks3.4.3,
3.4.5,3.4.8,4.4.1and4.4.3. Stiglitzmeasureswelfarenetof thecostsof turnover,
Le.,theGNPis measuredby p X +P xu- orq(X)L whereq (X)isthequit-rater r u J, u
and§is thetraining-costparameter.SincethiscanberewrittenasPrXr+PuXu-












In 1971,H. Singer[32]wrote,"As aneconomistI amboundtosaythatthe
mainavenuealongwhichonewouldlookforamajorcontributiontothesolutionof








Tables2 and3 summarizeourresultspertainingto thewelfarefunctionU. In




conditionsin Propositions3.3.1and4.3.1donothold. It shouldbeasimplebut
tediousmatterto providea morecompletetaxonomyusingour formulaeand
methods.It isdoubtfulwhetherthiswouldaddanyfurtherinsight.
In conclusion,it isworthreiteratingthatthegeneralizedHarris-Todaromodel
is of interestprimarilybecausebyanalyzingit, weanalyzeseveralmodelsallatonce.














(ew- ex)1 I > 21-'YrLr
() Q (1+X)1/ (1 - e )




() Q1/ (1-e)u uL u u w >(1- 'Y )u
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